The record
Everything below can be reproduced from the repository with the command named beside it. The second half of this page is the list of things nobody has verified, and it includes the one that matters most.
144 / 144
npm run verify
Six Uniswap v3 pools, twenty four amounts each, quoted by this engine and by Uniswap’s own QuoterV2 at the same pinned block. A quote counts only when the two agree on every digit.
120 of the 144 crossed at least one initialised tick, and the deepest crossed six. Ticks are where the arithmetic gets hard, so a suite that never crosses one has proved almost nothing.
12 / 12
npm run verifyv4
Twelve real swaps that already happened, replayed against the pool state at the block before each one, and compared against the amounts the chain recorded.
Every sample is counted, including the ones the quoter refuses to answer. An earlier version silently dropped those and reported nine of ten with nothing accounting for the tenth.
7 / 7
npm run testroutes
Each case is quoted, encoded into calldata, and executed against real pool state at the block it was quoted for. It passes only when the contract delivers exactly what the quote promised.
No deployment and no private key. The contract’s runtime bytecode is recovered by running its creation code inside an eth_call, then injected at an address with a state override.
The first time the contract executed a route it came up 5.5 parts per million short of the quote. Uniswap v4 charges its protocol fee on top of the liquidity provider fee rather than out of it, and the engine had been reading only lpFee.
Undercharging the fee means overquoting the trader, which is the direction that makes a real swap revert on its own minimum and charge gas for nothing. Five parts per million is far too small to notice by eye. It is the reason the standard here is exact agreement rather than close agreement.
The router contract compiles to 7.7 kB and has never been on a network. It takes custody of a trader’s tokens for the duration of a swap, which makes it the most dangerous code in the project. Nobody outside this project has read it.
These suites run against the liquidity that exists on the day they run. A route shape nothing currently prices will not appear in a run, and the suite reports which of the five hop kinds it actually reached rather than assuming it covered them all.
WETH on this chain is not the canonical immutable WETH9. It is an upgradeable proxy, and so is USDG. Both answer the EIP-1967 implementation slot with a live address. Treating the wrapper as one for one and unbounded is true of the code deployed today and is a statement about whoever controls that proxy.
The advantage over a single pool ran from zero to about fifteen basis points in the runs recorded here. Hours earlier the same ladder showed four times that. Nothing in the router changed between them, liquidity moved. Any figure quoted from this project carries the block it came from.
Asking for an exact amount out is answered by searching for the smallest input that clears it, so the result usually delivers a few parts per million more than asked. That is the safe direction to miss in, and it is reported rather than trimmed away.
The assistant beside the ticket reads the engine through tools and cannot state a figure it did not fetch, and it cannot sign: every swap it stages ends at the wallet prompt. What has not been measured is how often it misreads a request. There is no eval set for it yet, and until there is, treat what it says as a reading of the panel, not a substitute for it.
There is no audit badge on this site because there has been no audit. There are no partner logos because there are no partners, and no listing claims because nothing is listed. Every name that appears here is either a contract this project reads or a piece of software it runs.